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ABSTRACT
In the European context, the Commission is responsible for monitoring and
enforcing states’ compliance with EU legislation. However, the Commission
often entrusts external actors to monitor and assess implementation. To what
extent does the Commission withhold, partially or fully disclose compliance
assessments? Drawing on reputational accounts of bureaucratic performance,
it is expected that the Commission is confronted with competing incentives.
On the one hand, the Commission needs to justify enforcement decisions
based on expert evaluations. On the other hand, disseminating information
about non-compliance could exacerbate relations with the member states
and threatens to damage the Commission’s unique reputation as the main
guardian of the EU treaties. Employing a novel data-set on the transparency
of compliance assessments, it is found that the Commission discloses compli-
ance assessments prepared by highly competent external actors only partially.
The finding raises concerns about the extent to which wider audiences are
sufficiently informed about national implementation outcomes.
KEYWORDS Transparency; European Commission; compliance assessments; bureaucratic reputation;
EU enforcement
Accountability of political leaders to public demands lies at the heart of
democratic societies. Transparency is an important precondition for
accountability, as it affects the extent to which citizens are able to observe
deviations from the public interest and effectively voice their discontent
(Lindstedt and Naurin 2010; Naurin 2006). In international politics, trans-
parency encourages national representatives to take positions that cater to
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the preferences of their national constituencies during international nego-
tiations (Cross 2013; Stasavage 2004). Studies on transparency have
focused on electoral accountability as the key mechanism, prompting pol-
itical institutions to disclose and disseminate information. However, electoral
incentives are ill-suited to explaining the transparency of information
collected by non-majoritarian institutions in contemporary policy making.
Furthermore, as democratic norms are increasingly applied to international
organisations, there is a need to broaden the focus of the transparency of
data collected by supranational institutions (Grigorescu 2007).
The present study analyzes the transparency of compliance data regard-
ing member states’ implementation performance held by the European
Commission. While the EU Commission is responsible for both monitor-
ing and enforcing compliance with EU legislation, it often entrusts exter-
nal consultancies to collect data and assess the implementation of specific
rules (Zhelyazkova et al. 2016). Under what conditions does the EU
enforcement institution withhold, partially reveal or fully publicise assess-
ments about member states’ implementation activities? Drawing on theo-
ries of bureaucratic reputation and blame-avoidance (Carpenter 2001;
Hood 2007), I argue that the Commission faces competing incentives to
disclose information about member states’ compliance gaps. On the one
hand, transparency helps the Commission justify decisions to start
infringement proceedings against law-violating governments based on
credible information. On the other hand, transparency of policy violations
could aggravate relations with non-compliant member states. Public dis-
closure of external assessments could also raise questions about the
Commission’s own competences to evaluate member states’ compliance.
Under these conditions, the Commission is expected to reveal enforced
violations by member states only to interested parties who request access
to specific compliance assessments (i.e., limited disclosure). Moreover, the
expertise of external monitoring agencies helps the EU oversight institu-
tion justify its enforcement actions. However, the Commission is unlikely
to make external compliance assessments public to avoid attacks about
limited capacities to evaluate member states’ implementation perform-
ance. This is especially the case, when the assessments have been prepared
by highly competent consultancies that threaten the Commission’s unique
reputation as the guardian of EU treaties.
These hypotheses are tested with a novel data-set on the secrecy, lim-
ited and full public disclosure of external compliance assessments held by
the EU Commission. The analysis supports the conjecture that transpar-
ency outcomes are conditional on external expertise. While the
Commission responds positively to individual requests to share member
states’ compliance data, it shies away from publicly disseminating
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compliance assessments prepared by highly competent consultancies. The
findings from this study have implications for the legitimacy of supra-
national enforcement, as they suggest that the Commission strategically
uses the transparency of member states’ activities to avoid reputation
losses with respect to failing to fulfil its obligations.
Bureaucratic reputation and transparency
Transparency of policy outcomes is a multifaceted concept – broadly
defined it can pertain to any dimension of accountability and democracy
(Dahl 1971; Hollyer et al. 2011). While recent studies provide a more pre-
cise definition of transparency as ‘the release of information by institutions
that is relevant to evaluating those institutions’ (Bauhr and Grimes 2014;
Florini 1999: 5; Hollyer et al. 2011), most research focuses on the trans-
parency of governments. However, as governments have transferred
extensive powers to independent non-majoritarian institutions, non-
elected bodies also face increasing pressures to justify that they operate
fairly, openly, and transparently (Maggetti 2010). Although there is a
growing research on the transparency of central banks (Cukierman 2009;
Eijffinger and Geraats 2006), the empirical implications from these studies
are often restricted to monitory policy and the predictability of finan-
cial markets.
In this study, I adopt a broader view to non-majoritarian institutions
by arguing that decisions for transparency are generally driven by reputa-
tional incentives and concerns by non-elected bodies (Hood 2007).
Bureaucratic reputation is broadly defined as a set of symbolic beliefs about
the capacities, history, roles, obligations, and mission of an organisation that
are embedded in multiple audiences (Blom-Hansen and Finke 2020;
Carpenter 2010; Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013). Bureaucratic reputation
is a valuable asset for non-majoritarian organisations as it helps them build
political support for their activities (Blom-Hansen and Finke 2020) and
shields them from political attacks (Hood 2002; Weaver 1986). Transparency
of information helps organisations boost their reputation by demonstrating
that they can create solutions to problems (e.g. expertise, efficiency) and pro-
vide services (e.g. moral protection) that are in line with the expectations
held by key audiences. In addition, transparency prompts organisations to
limit blame for unfavourable outcomes through various presentational, pol-
icy, and agency strategies (Hood 2002; 2007; Weaver 1986).
A number of studies have demonstrated that reputational concerns
affect organisational strategies to communicate information about their
activities (Gilad et al. 2015; Hood 2007; Maor et al. 2013). In particular,
Maor et al. (2013) find that national regulators respond to allegations to
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core tasks regarding which their reputation is weak or it is still evolving.
Conversely, a regulator who enjoys a strong reputation can afford to keep
silent when faced with criticism about core activities. Furthermore, regula-
tory agencies are more likely to publicly acknowledge problems when
accused of being overly lenient, but they deny allegations that regulation
is excessive (Gilad et al. 2015). Existing research also shows that the
media are less likely to report on observed errors, when a regulator has
an established reputation for scientific expertise (Maor 2011).
One of the major findings from these studies is that the observability of
errors damages the reputation of regulators as competent and expert-based
institutions (Maor 2011). Therefore, organisations have incentives to hide
unfavourable outcomes from their audience. However, it is also important
to acknowledge that organisations have incentives to limit the transparency
of favourable outcomes for which they cannot claim credit and that could
even threaten their unique position (Carpenter 2001, 2010). Moreover,
existing research assumes that transparency only affects institutions that
disseminate information about their own activities. In the context of pol-
icy enforcement, however, the transparency of non-compliance does not
only affect enforcement actors but their separate audiences too. On the
one hand, transparency of implementation performance and detected
non-compliance could boost the public image of enforcement agencies
as competent and credible guardians of the law (Etienne 2015; Maor
and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013). On the other hand, information about
non-compliance negatively affects the reputation of law-violating actors
by exposing their implementation gaps. Currently, we lack understand-
ing which of these opposing reputational logics drives the decisions of
enforcement institutions to disclose compliance gaps. Do enforcement
agencies strive to maintain their own reputation as competent actors
or do they yield to pressures from audiences benefitting from non-
compliance1?
The present study addresses these gaps in knowledge by focussing on
the transparency of compliance data held by the EU’s centralised enforce-
ment institution: the EU Commission. As a supranational actor, the
Commission faces competing pressures from more diverse audiences than
national enforcement bodies, which include the EU governments, the EU
Parliament, the media, organised interests, and the wider European public
(Blom-Hansen and Finke 2020: 136). Furthermore, the increasing compe-
tences of the Commission have invigorated public concerns about the
EU’s inherent democratic deficit. Whereas increased transparency could
ameliorate these concerns, revealed information could also threaten the
Commission’s reputation in relation to specific audiences that are nega-
tively affected by supranational decisions.
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Enforcement, monitoring and transparency of compliance data
in the EU
In the context of supranational enforcement, the EU Commission repre-
sents the Union’s centralised enforcement system that is responsible for
both monitoring member states’ compliance with EU law and prosecuting
law-violating member states by starting infringement proceedings
(McCormick 2015: 169–72; van Voorst and Mastenbroek 2017).
The infringement procedure consists of three formal consecutive stages:
a letter of formal notice, a reasoned opinion, and, ultimately, a referral to
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). With each stage of the infringement
procedure, the Commission increases the pressure on member states to
comply. In particular, letters of formal notice aim to eliminate cases of
uncertainty about member states’ non-compliance. If a member state fails
to provide a satisfactory answer to a formal letter, the Commission issues
a reasoned opinion outlining the nature of the violation and demanding
that the respective government rectifies the problem. If the member state
in question continues its actions in breach of the EU law, the infringe-
ment proceeding enters the third stage, wherein the Commission refers
the member state to the ECJ. However, the Commission uses litigation as
a last resort, and the majority of cases are resolved before the final stage
of the procedure (B€orzel et al. 2012; Hofmann 2018).
Whereas the enforcement obligations of the Commission are formally
codified in the EU Treaties, this is not the case for its monitoring activ-
ities. In practice, the Commission traditionally relies on three types of
instruments to monitor compliance. First, the Commission requires that
member state governments incorporate the EU directives in national
legislation before a specified deadline. The Commission also regularly
asks governments to prepare ‘congruence tables’ indicating how each dir-
ective provision is implemented in national legislation (Smith 2015).
Second, much like other oversight institutions, the Commission relies on
reactive ‘fire-alarms’ sounded by individuals, organised interests (e.g. trade
unions and non-governmental organisations) and companies, which are
negatively affected by non-compliance (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984;
Tallberg 2002). Third, the Commission could also actively ‘police’ mem-
ber states by conducting ad-hoc inspections in a number of countries
regarding specific policy issues (B€orzel and Knoll 2012; Smith 2015;
Tallberg 2002).
Despite these mechanisms, the Commission’s ability to oversee compli-
ance across 27 member states and various policy areas remains limited.
For example, national governments are generally reluctant to submit con-
gruence tables that outline their level conformity with EU directives, and
even if they meet the directives’ deadlines, this doesn’t mean they comply
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substantively. Furthermore, reactive oversight relies on societal mobilisa-
tion and engagement of domestic actors to raise complaints about non-
compliance (Cichowski 2007; Sedelmeier 2008). However, some member
states suffer from weak societal mobilisation structures to effectively
monitor their governments (Howard 2003; Schrama 2017). Finally, the
Commission officials can only conduct a limited number of on-site checks
in the member states, which tend to be time-consuming and politically
contentious (B€orzel and Knoll 2012). Consequently, the EU Commission
increasingly relies on third parties, including consultancies, legal experts,
and academic institutions, to actively monitor and evaluate the implemen-
tation of EU policies across different member states (van Voorst and
Mastenbroek 2017: 642; Zhelyazkova et al. 2016). Third-party monitoring
fulfils two main purposes. First, external consultancies conduct conform-
ity-checking studies assessing how each EU requirement is incorporated in
national legislation (Smith 2015). Second, the EU Commission also dele-
gates responsibilities to external actors to collect data about the practical
implementation of EU policies, thus, avoiding resource-intensive and pol-
itically fraught ‘in-house’ investigations in the member states (B€orzel
2001; B€orzel et al. 2012; Tallberg 2002). In other words, third-party moni-
toring both complements and substitutes the Commission’s traditional
instruments to monitor compliance. For example, since 2003, Milieu Ltd
has been conducting conformity-checking studies2 of the transposition of
directives related environmental EU policies (see Online appendix).
Furthermore, Milieu also evaluates the practical implementation of EU
directives through surveys, interviews, and questionnaires with relevant
domestic stakeholders. In some instances, interest groups are also con-
tracted to analyse member states’ compliance with specific rules. For
example, Association of European Chambers of Commerce
(Eurochambers) has evaluated the implementation of the ‘Services direct-
ive’ based on stakeholder surveys.
While there is still no empirical research on the causes and consequen-
ces of third-party monitoring in the EU context, the Commission
acknowledges that the purpose of external assessments is to inform
about the need for commencing infringement proceedings against non-
compliant member states (Commission correspondence, 30.1.2015).
Nevertheless, the EU Commission remains responsible for curbing non-
compliance with EU policies. The use of external consultancies appears
decentralised and the Commission enjoys discretion whether to accept
and act upon the conclusions from an external study and whether or not
to divulge external assessments to the public (Kr€amer 2014; Smith 2015).
At the same time, the EU has been facing increasing demands for
more transparency (Cross 2013). Norms of transparency are currently
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enshrined in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 regarding public access to
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, which
demands greater openness in the work of EU institutions. The regulation
puts into effect the right of public access to documents produced and
processed by any EU body. Thus, it also obliges the Commission to grant
public access to documents that are obtained from third parties. However,
EU actors can decide whether and how to meet pressures for transpar-
ency. For example, the Commission can grant access to information about
member states’ compliance to interested parties and upon formal requests
only (limited disclosure). Alternatively, the Commission can make com-
pliance assessments publicly available on its website (public disclosure).
Finally, the Commission officials can also reject demands for disclosing
assessments about member states’ compliance (secrecy) when they con-
cern sensitive information that could damage relations with national gov-
ernments (Commission correspondence, 3.5.2015).
Enforcement and transparency of member states’
implementation gaps
In line with reputation-based accounts of bureaucratic behaviour, the
Commission is expected to respond to reputation incentives and costs of
revealing information about member states’ compliance. In the context of
EU enforcement, there are two opposing reputational logics that lead to
contradictory expectations about the transparency of compliance data.
Based on the first logic, the Commission’s reputation depends on its cap-
acity to detect violations by EU member states and effectively prosecute
instances of non-compliance. As a credible enforcement agent, the
Commission also needs to appear unbiased in its decisions to expose and
punish law-violating member states (Majone 2005; Tallberg 2002). For
example, when women’s rights NGOs publicised that Poland had failed to
establish an appropriate institution to supervise the equal access to goods
and services, the Polish government claimed that the country was granted
an exemption from this requirement. The relevant Directorate-General
(DG) denied this claim and immediately started infringement proceedings
against Poland (Sudbery 2010). Thus, the Commission is sensitive to
accusations about non-enforcement of member states’ implementation
problems and is willing to defend its reputation to external observers.
I expect that the Commission will be willing to publicly disclose com-
pliance data, when it successfully prosecuted law-violating governments.
Transparency of compliance offers enforcement actors a protective shield
against hostile audiences, who threaten to challenge their decisions
(Busuioc and Lodge 2017; Hood 2002, 2011). Much like other
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enforcement actors, the EU Commission faces pressures to maintain an
image of a credible enforcement institution whose actions are informed
by evidence-based expertise of member states’ implementation activities.
Consequently, if the Commission decides to prosecute cases of non-con-
formity, it is also pressured to justify its actions. This is especially import-
ant in situations of enforcement, when domestic actors and member states
benefiting from non-compliance have incentives to challenge the
Commission enforcement activities (K€onig and M€ader 2014). In other
words, the disclosure of member states’ compliance problems shields the
Commission from blame for unjustified enforcement.
H1a: The Commission is more likely to publicly disclose information about
member states’ implementation activities (relative to limited disclosure and
secrecy), if it started infringement proceedings against non-compliance.
Conversely, based on the second reputational logic, compliance assess-
ments reflect badly on the EU governments, especially when they expose
implementation gaps that triggered infringement proceedings by the
Commission (B€orzel et al. 2012). The EU policy-making process is based
on consensus, where national representatives try to reach compromises
(Thomson 2011). In principle, compromise-based decision making should
alleviate problems of non-compliance at the implementation stage
(Thomson et al. 2007). Under these circumstances, instances of excessive
non-compliance reveal that national governments have failed to honour
their supranational commitments despite adopted compromises.
Furthermore, public revelations about non-compliance risk mobilising
domestic groups benefitting from the EU policies against national govern-
ments. Facing pressures from the EU member states, the Commission is
expected not to publicize member states’ implementation gaps. However,
the Commission could still justify the initiation of infringement proceed-
ings by responding to individual requests to share compliance data. As a
result, the Commission is more likely to partially share member states’
implementation outcomes, when this information is demanded.
H1b: The Commission is more likely to disclose information about
member states’ implementation activities only to interested parties (limited
disclosure), if it started infringement proceedings against non-compliance.
The conditional effect of external monitoring expertise
Furthermore, the expertise of third-party monitoring moderates the rela-
tionship between enforcement and transparency. The reputation of non-
majoritarian institutions depends on expertise-based performance that
forms ‘the core basis for the expectations of their multiple regulator
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audiences’ (Carpenter 2001; Rimkut_e 2018: 73). In the EU context, this
means that decisions to enforce compliance should be guided by involving
external actors with high level of expertise.
However, the public disclosure of member states’ implementation gaps
could also harm reputationally the Commission, especially if compliance
data was obtained by highly competent and experienced monitoring insti-
tutions. Theories of bureaucratic reputation have emphasised the import-
ance of ‘reputation uniqueness’ by referring to the ability of organisations
to show that they can deliver outputs that cannot be obtained from their
competitors (Carpenter 2001; Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2016; Rimkut_e
2018). Moreover, organisations are also engaged in cultivating different
types of reputation regarding their unique expertise and capacities to per-
form different tasks (Maor 2011). In the context of EU enforcement, the
Commission nurtures two unique types of reputation: (1) as a competent
monitoring agency that oversees compliance across all member states and
policy areas and (2) as an unbiased enforcement institution that prose-
cutes law violations based on credible evidence about states’ implementa-
tion performance. These two reputational bases work in opposition. On
the one hand, credible enforcement depends on extensive data collection
about member states’ performance at different stages of the implementa-
tion process and, hence, requires the services of highly professional moni-
toring agencies. On the other hand, the Commission is also the main
oversight institution responsible for monitoring compliance across mem-
ber states. While relying on third-party monitoring alleviates the costs of
conducting own investigations, it also increases competition from over-
sight institutions, especially those with extensive competences to monitor
compliance in different countries and issue areas. After all, some EU
member states may prefer to relocate resources for monitoring compli-
ance to external consultancies. In a similar vein, monitoring capacity is
not just a matter of data availability about member states’ implementation
performance, but it also requires a discernible capacity to analyse compli-
ance data. By promoting compliance assessments by highly professional
consultancies, the Commission risks signalling that it has limited capaci-
ties to conduct compliance evaluations itself. Finally, transparency of
third-party compliance assessments inhibits ‘credit-claiming’ for expert-
based enforcement (Weaver 1986). In other words, the Commission can-
not cultivate a positive reputation as a competent enforcement agent,
when another organisation detected all implementation gaps.
Based on the arguments above, I expect that the Commission is likely to
share compliance assessments prepared by external actors with extensive
monitoring expertise, only to a limited extent. However, the Commission is
unlikely to disseminate this information to wider audiences.
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H2: The Commission is more likely to disclose information about enforced
implementation gaps on demand (limited disclosure), when compliance
data was obtained from a credible and competent oversight institution.
H3: The Commission is less likely to publicly disclose information about
enforced implementation gaps (public disclosure), when compliance data
was obtained from a credible and competent oversight institution.
Data and methods
In order to test hypotheses, the present study relies on a unique dataset
on different levels of transparency of external compliance assessments
held by the Commission.3 Compliance assessments concern the imple-
mentation performance of a member state regarding a specific EU direct-
ive. The analysis focuses on directives because the Commission prioritises
directives in post-hoc evaluations about member states’ implementation
(van Voorst and Mastenbroek 2017). Furthermore, most compliance
assessments concern conformity-checking studies of the transposition of
EU directives in national legislation. EU instruments such as regulations
and decisions are excluded from such assessments because they do not
require transposition. Finally, while I uncovered evaluations on the appli-
cation of EU regulations, these studies mostly discussed best practices
rather than member states’ level of compliance.
The empirical analysis is limited to four policy areas: Internal Market
and Services; Justice and Home Affairs (JHA); Environment; and Social
Policy. The selection aims to ensure variation with respect to the
Commission enforcement activities and builds on existing research on
reputation and transparency. First, the sectors differ in the number of
infringement cases issued by the Commission. Whereas Environment is
generally the most infringement-prone policy area, fewer infringement
cases were opened against the Social Policy directives (B€orzel and Knoll
2012; Zhelyazkova et al. 2016). Second, the selection accounts for sectorial
differences regarding the strength of reputational mechanisms discussed
in the literature (Maor et al. 2013). In particular, the EU has an estab-
lished reputation in regulating Internal Market policy. Instead, the EU’s
competences to legislate on immigration and social policy are relatively
new and its reputation in these areas is still evolving.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to collect data on transparency for
all major policy areas within the scope of a single study. As the
Commission does not inform citizens which EU policies are subject to
external compliance assessment, uncovering the existence of all assess-
ment reports is highly cumbersome and time-consuming. Before collect-
ing information on transparency, I identified all relevant EU policies in
each sector and manually searched for conformity-checking and
10 A. ZHELYAZKOVA
implementation reports using various EU sources, including
OpenSpending datasets (2015) and OpenTender.org (on the EU’s contrac-
tual relations with external consultancies), the Commission annual over-
views, and the working programmes of the relevant DGs. I also contacted
the Commission and the external consultancies to ensure that a given dir-
ective was subject to assessment.
The external evaluation reports were prepared in the period between
2005 and 2013 and encompass all member states except Croatia. Because
external agencies evaluated member states’ compliance only once, the unit
of analysis reflects the level of transparency of evaluations regarding the
implementation of an EU directive by a given member state. The final
sample includes transparency of conformity assessments regarding 69 EU
directives4 in relation to 27 member states (Social Policy directives (11),
Internal Market (18), Justice and Home Affairs (18), Environment (22)),
which amounts to 1843 potential transparency outcomes. However, not
all member states were subject to evaluations and some directives were
not applicable to all EU member states (e.g. the UK, Denmark and
Ireland have opt-outs for some JHA directives).
Dependent variable: transparency outcomes
The dependent variable is the Commission’s transparency practices in
relation to external assessments about a member state’s compliance with a
given directive. Thus, the analysis captures the extent to which the rele-
vant DGs publicly disclose compliance data beyond the formal transpar-
ency requirements. Many of the compliance assessments are publicly
available on the websites of the relevant DGs in the EU Commission
(public disclosure). When this was not the case, I requested the remaining
assessments using the Commission online request form. In most cases,
the Commission provided individual access to reports about the perform-
ance of some member states, but refused to disclose information about
others. Based on this information, it is possible to identify three distinct
types of transparency practices: (1) Secrecy (the Commission refused to
disclose information about member states’ implementation activities); (2)
Limited disclosure (the Commission granted individual access to requested
assessments, but did not make the information public) and (3) Public dis-
closure (the report is publicly available on the Commission website).
As all assessments are subject to the same formal rules, analysing prac-
tices enables studying actual transparency of compliance data across pol-
icy areas, directives and member states. Nevertheless, this approach has
potential weaknesses. In particular, transparency practices may change
over time. For example, the Commission may impose only temporary
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restrictions over the dissemination of information. To address this con-
cern, I revisited the Commission websites a year after the completion of
the project to see whether any of the requested reports were publicly
available. In the case of rejected reports, I re-sent requests for information
disclosure a year after completing the data collection.5
Supranational enforcement and external monitoring expertise
The measure for supranational enforcement records whether or not the
Commission opened an infringement case against a member state regarding
an EU directive (Infringement case ¼ 1). The Commission infringement
database provides information about individual stages of the infringement
procedure (‘formal letter’, ‘reasoned opinion’ and ‘referral to the ECJ’) for
specific member states and directives. Because all compliance assessments
relate to the conformity of national legislation and implementation out-
comes, the analysis focuses on infringement cases that were specifically
opened against ‘non-conformity’.6 As letters of formal notice serve to elim-
inate cases of uncertainty, the analysis is based on the issuing of a reasoned
opinion (coded as 1). The reasoned opinion constitutes the first stage where
the Commission establishes that there is a problem of non-compliance.
External monitoring expertise is captured by characteristics of the
external oversight institution charged with evaluating member states’ imple-
mentation activities. An oversight institution is deemed to have narrow
expertise if it has assessed member states’ legal conformity with only one
directive (coded as 0). Monitoring expertise is higher, but still limited if an
external institution has been contracted to evaluate legal compliance in
relation to multiple directives from one policy area (coded as 1). Instead,
contracted consultancies with diverse expertise have prepared compliance
assessments for directives from different policy areas (e.g. environment and
internal market) (coded as 2). Finally, agencies with extensive monitoring
expertise are not only able to provide compliance assessments concerning
various issues, but they also analyse different stages of the implementation
process (e.g. both legal and practical implementation) (coded as 3). Thus,
the measure captures the expertise of oversight institutions to inspect mem-
ber states’ compliance on diverse issues and at distinct stages of the imple-
mentation process.7 The indicator for external monitoring expertise is a
continuous variable (that ranges between 0 and 3) in the main analysis and
it is a categorical variable in the robustness checks (see Online appendix).
Alternative explanations: the power of different audiences
The analysis also accounts for the possibility that the Commission is
responsive to demands of different audiences. In particular, member states
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are generally reluctant to have their implementation gaps exposed to the
public because non-compliance could damage their international reputations
as cooperative partners committed to compliance with EU legislation. States
are more sensitive to reputational costs imposed by external actors, the
more dependent they are on future co-operation (B€orzel et al. 2012;
Keohane and Nye 1977). On the one hand, exposed non-compliance has a
stronger negative impact on smaller states with limited weight in the EU
decision-making process. On the other hand, the Commission may be more
responsive to challenges by more powerful EU member states (B€orzel et al.
2012) and refuse to disclose data about their implementation gaps. Member
states’ voting power is quantified based on the Banzhaf index (Banzhaf
1965). Furthermore, the Commission may not want to further alienate
Eurosceptic publics and governments by publicly disclosing their implemen-
tation performance. Societal support for EU integration is computed based
on different Eurobarometer surveys related to issues from each of the four
policy areas. Eurobarometer has regularly asked respondents whether they
believe that particular policies should be decided by their national govern-
ment (coded as 1), or by the EU (coded as 2). The variable takes the aver-
age score for the years where information is available on societal preferences
regarding a particular policy sector. The measure for government EU support
is based on the Chapel Hill surveys on party positions (Bakker et al. 2015).
The measure records the average position on EU integration for all parties
in government, weighted by their seat share in government in the year that
the directive was implemented by a given member state.8
The EU Commission could also refrain from revealing member states’
implementation outcomes, if non-compliance favours powerful domestic
interest groups. To control for the influence of interest group intermedi-
ation, the analysis accounts for country-level corporatism based on the
ICTWSS database on institutional characteristics of trade unions, wage
setting, state intervention, and social pacts (Visser 2015). In a more cor-
poratist system, national implementation outcomes are more likely to
reflect interest group preferences.9
Finally, the Commission may decide not to reveal member states’
implementation activities, when it holds similar preferences to national
governments on substantive policy issues. This argument is theoretically
grounded in theories of legislative–bureaucratic relations suggesting that
executive actors cater to legislators who support similar policy objectives
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1994). Furthermore, existing research has also
shown that the Commission policy preferences affect its enforcement
behaviour (Thomson et al. 2007). To measure levels of preference align-
ment between member states and the Commission, I first computed
the left–right position of states’ government at the time of policy
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implementation (Crombez and Hix 2015) based on the ParlGov database. I
also identified the party position of each relevant Commissioner who was
in charge of a given policy area at the date of transposition of a directive.10
The indicator for preference alignment captures the proximity between the
Commission and member state government on the left–right dimension.
Alternative sources of compliance data
The final set of controls accounts for the possibility that information
about member states’ compliance could be disseminated through alterna-
tive channels, not controlled by the EU’s centralised enforcement system.
For example, some member states are more likely to disclose information
about their activities because of strong Freedom of Information (FOI)
laws. The measure for government transparency was obtained from the
World Economic Forum (WEF) (Schwab 2015). It captures how easy it is
for businesses in a country to obtain information about changes in gov-
ernment policies and regulations affecting their activities.
In addition, compliance data could be disclosed by national parlia-
ments with privileged access to information about EU affairs. National
parliaments differ in the extent to which they oblige governments to share
information about their EU-related activities (Winzen 2012). I employ the
‘National parliamentary control of European Union affairs’ data-set indi-
cators for the presence and stringency of EU-related information require-
ments imposed by national parliaments on their executives.
Finally, information about (non-)compliance can be obtained and dissemi-
nated through ‘fire-alarms’ sounded by affected citizens and interest groups
(McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Tallberg 2002). Existing research suggests
that the effectiveness of ‘fire-alarm’ supervision depends on the strength of
civil society (Sedelmeier 2008). I employ two separate indicators for civil soci-
ety strength: citizen participation in voluntary organisations and the involve-
ment of civil society organisations (CSOs) in government consultations
(Schrama and Zhelyazkova 2018). Civic participation is measured by the per-
centage of respondents in Eurobarometer surveys who volunteer in organisa-
tions specifically focussing on the issue areas covered in this study. CSO
involvement in policy making is based on data from the V-Dem project
(Coppedge et al. 2019) whether major CSOs are routinely consulted by pol-
icy-makers on issues relevant to their members. The Online appendix
presents the descriptive statistics for all variables employed in the analysis.
Explaining the transparency of compliance assessments
The empirical analysis applies multinomial logistic regression because the
dependent variable comprises three distinct levels of transparency: secrecy,
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limited disclosure and public disclosure. Furthermore, transparency practi-
ces concerning compliance assessments are likely dependent on decisions
to evaluate member states’ implementation performance. Enforcement
institutions that face reputational threats from disclosing compliance data
may be reluctant to keep records of sensitive information (Etienne 2015;
Hood 2007). Transparency practices could be also endogenous to deci-
sions to delegate responsibilities to external oversight institutions with
extensive expertise. Therefore, I controlled for the potential dependency
of transparency practices on the availability of external compliance assess-
ments in the robustness analysis (see below).
Before discussing the results on the impact of enforcement and moni-
toring expertise on transparency, I assess the probabilities of different
transparency outcomes. Figure 1 shows that the Commission often grants
access to compliance assessments either on demand or publicly. On aver-
age, the Commission refuses to disclose only 8 percent of the total exter-
nal assessments, while the average probability of limited and public
disclosure is 50 and 42 percent respectively. However, transparency out-
comes are unequally distributed across the four policy areas. In particular,
all assessments concerning Social Policy directives were publicly available.
This finding supports existing research that non-majoritarian institutions
are more vocal and transparent in areas, where they do not have an estab-
lished reputation yet (Maor et al. 2013). Additional robustness checks
Figure 1. Probabilities of secrecy, limited and public disclosure of assessment reports.
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excluding Social policy directives did not produce substantially different
results (see online appendix).
Table 1 presents the estimates from the main analysis of secrecy, lim-
ited, and public disclosure of compliance assessments. Models 1–4 show
the likelihood of limited (Models 1 and 2) and public disclosure (Models
3 and 4) of compliance assessments relative to secrecy. Models 5 and 6
show the likelihood of public compared to limited disclosure of compli-
ance data. In addition, the analysis tests the moderating effect of external
monitoring expertise on the relationship between enforcement and trans-
parency practices (Models 2, 4 and 6). All models include robust standard
errors at the level of EU directives. The online appendix presents the
results when controlling for policy-area differences and robust standard
errors at the level of member states.11
Contrary to the expectations in H1(a–b), the issuing of reasoned opin-
ions by the Commission does not significantly influence the transparency
of compliance assessments. Figure 2 further illustrates that the
Commission is less likely to keep compliance assessments confidential
regardless of whether it started infringement proceedings. However, the
predicted probability of public disclosure increases if the Commission
opened an infringement case. Although the change is not significant, it
indicates that the Commission does not shy away from publicly shaming
law-violating member states by exposing their implementation gaps.
While we do not find strong support for the direct relationship
between Commission enforcement and transparency, the analysis indi-
cates that the expertise of external overseers moderates this relationship,
as evidenced by the significant interaction effects. To facilitate the inter-
pretation of the results, Figure 3 illustrates the probabilities of limited
(left-hand) and public disclosure (right-hand) versus secrecy at different
levels of external monitoring expertise and for enforced non-compliance
(infringement case ¼ 1). The figure specifically highlights the transpar-
ency of member states’ implementation gaps that triggered the start of the
infringement procedure by the EU Commission. Figure 3 illustrates the
contrasting effect of external expertise on the transparency of member
states’ implementation of EU directives. In particular, the Commission is
more likely to disclose – albeit to a limited extent — information about
member states’ policy deviations that led to the initiation of infringements
proceedings. In line with H2, the effect is significant only when this informa-
tion was collected by an agency with extensive experience in assessing compli-
ance. The result supports the conjecture that the Commission seeks to justify
its enforcement decisions by relying on highly competent external actors.
Conversely, the probability of public disclosure of member states’ pros-
ecuted non-compliance decreases for higher levels of external
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monitoring expertise (right-hand). The probability that the Commission
will publicly reveal compliance assessments is 0.85 if information is col-
lected and assessed by an institution with narrow monitoring expertise
and decreases to 0.32 for assessment reports prepared by agencies with
extensive resources to monitor various stages of the policy cycle.
Compliance assessments prepared by highly competent agencies have
equal chance to be kept confidential as evidenced by the overlapping
confidence intervals (right-hand).
In sum, the analysis shows that higher levels of external monitoring
expertise help the Commission justify enforcement decisions (when
demanded), but it also decreases the observability of implementation gaps
Table 1. Multinomial logit analysis of the secrecy, limited and public disclosure of







Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E) Coef. (S.E)
Enforcement (Infr.
case ¼ 1)
0.267 2.982 0.710 1.223 0.977 1.759
(0.452) (1.111) (0.688) (0.754) (0.554) 1.003
External expertise 0.229 0.322 1.083 1.168 0.854 0.846
(0.199) (0.199) (0.261) (0.275) (0.243) (0.256)
MS voting power 0.042 0.040 0.055 0.053 0.013 0.013
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.021) (0.021)
Societal EU support 1.529 1.550 1.576 1.590 0.047 0.040
(0.555) (0.549) (0.616) (0.607) (0.380) (0.379)
Gov’t EU support 0.157 0.174 0.299 0.316 0.142 0.142
(0.124) (0.121) (0.125) (0.122) (0.057) (0.058)
Corporatism 0.024 0.027 0.087 0.089 0.062 0.062
(0.166) (0.165) (0.176) (0.174) (0.089) (0.089)
COM-MS left-right
agreement
0.339 0.343 0.425 0.428 0.086 0.085
(0.063) (0.064) (0.086) (0.086) (0.061) (0.062)
Gov’t transparency 0.041 0.055 0.153 0.166 0.112 0.111
(0.090) (0.088) (0.085) (0.083) (0.050) (0.049)
Parl. control over
information
0.288 0.311 0.258 0.277 0.030 0.034
(0.192) (0.177) (0.187) (0.173) (0.108) (0.108)
Civic participation 0.055 0.050 0.059 0.054 0.003 0.004
(0.047) (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) (0.044) (0.045)
CSO consultation 0.071 0.080 0.056 0.066 0.014 0.014





Constant 0.641 0.714 0.815 0.881 0.175 0.167
(1.637) (1.671) (1.634) (1.669) (0.816) (0.817)
N 1180 1180 1180 1180 1180 1180
pseudo R2 0.152 0.155 0.152 0.155 0.152 0.155
AIC 1.922.572 1.919.910 1.922.572 1.919.910 1.922.572 1.919.910
BIC 2.044.331 2.051.815 2.044.331 2.051.815 2.044.331 2.051.815
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to wider audiences. The results from Model 1 also show that the negative
effect of agency expertise on public disclosure is not conditional on
enforcement (see Figure 4). Therefore, the Commission is unlikely to
Figure 2. Effect of enforcement on secrecy, limited and public disclosure.
Figure 3. Comparing the predicted probabilities of transparency outcomes at varying
levels of external expertise and for enforced non-compliance.
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advertise the assessments of agencies with extensive expertise, even when
member states’ complied with an EU directive (i.e. when the Commission
did not start infringement cases). This result supports the assumption
that the Commission strategically guards its unique reputation as the
main supervision institution responsible for assessing member states’
implementation. Publicly advertising the expertise of external overseers
makes the Commission vulnerable to blame for excessively relying on
third-party monitoring. Furthermore, compliance assessments produced
by agencies with extensive monitoring expertise decrease the ability of the
Commission to claim credit for monitoring member states’ compliance
(Hood 2011; Weaver 1986).
The analysis in Table 1 also supports the relevance of government
characteristics on the public disclosure of compliance assessments. More
precisely, the Commission is more likely to publicly reveal information
about the implementation performance of more EU-supportive govern-
ments and member states with overwhelmingly Europhile publics (see
Figure 4). Conversely, the Commission is hesitant to further aggravate its
relations with Eurosceptic governments12 and avoids antagonising
Eurosceptic citizens by publicly disclosing compliance data. The analysis
also shows that the Commission is less likely to reveal information
about a member state’s implementation performance, the more it
Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of transparency outcomes at varying levels of exter-
nal expertise, level of congruence b/n the Commission a member state on the left-
right dimension, government EU support and societal EU support.
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holds similar policy preferences with the respective government on the
left–right dimension. Figure 4 illustrates that the more the overseeing
Commissioner and the implementing government align on the left–right
dimension, the lower the probability of public disclosure and the higher
the probability of secrecy. This result is in line with theories of legisla-
tive—bureaucratic relations based on which the Commission is expected
to cater to governments, who share their policy objectives (Epstein and
O’Halloran 1994; Thomson and Torenvlied 2011).
The analysis shows that the Commission is still responsive to govern-
ment preferences in decisions regarding the public disclosure of member
states’ implementation outcomes. However, the guardian of the Treaties
does not respond to all relevant audiences. Neither member states’ deci-
sion power, nor different levels of corporatism significantly affect the
transparency of compliance assessments. Decisions to withhold or reveal
compliance assessments do not depend on alternative sources of informa-
tion either, as government transparency, parliamentary control, and civil
society strength (CSO consultation and civic participation) do not have
significant effects on transparency (see Table 1).
Robustness analysis
In order to verify the results from the multinomial logit models, I con-
ducted various robustness checks that are presented in the online appen-
dix. First, I estimated Heckman probit models on the likelihood that
transparency practices depend on the Commission incentives to delegate
authorities to external agencies. The selection equation further controls
for additional factors informed by transaction-cost models of delegation
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1994). In particular, the Commission is expected
to delegate monitoring responsibilities regarding highly complex issues.
Policy complexity is commonly measured as the number of recitals in a
directive (Thomson and Torenvlied 2011; van Voorst and Mastenbroek
2017). Moreover, the Commission is less likely to require the services of
external agencies, if it can single-handedly monitor compliance across
member states. Thus, the analysis controls for the presence of reporting
clauses in a directive requiring member states to regularly inform the
Commission of their implementation activities (Zhelyazkova and
Yordanova 2015). Finally, the Commission is more likely to request
assessments by external actors when a directive was adopted jointly by
the Council and the EU Parliament. In this case, the Commission does
not only need to satisfy demands by the member states, but also by the
Parliament (Blom-Hansen and Finke 2020). The results do not substan-
tially differ from the main analysis.13
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Second, I also tested alternative model specifications to validate the
main findings. The robustness analysis partially controls for the
Commissioners’ policy preferences based on their positions on the eco-
nomic and cultural left–right dimensions. The measure assumes that
Commissioners with more economically rightist positions are more likely
to agree with the objectives of Internal Market directives, whereas the
opposite is true for Social policy directives. In a similar vein, more cultur-
ally liberal Commissioners are expected to emphasise the importance
member states’ compliance with environmental and JHA directives. The
indicator at least partially accounts for the Commission’s varying policy
preferences in the absence of more precise data.
Conclusion and discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate the conditions under which the
EU’s centralised enforcement institution reveals information about mem-
ber states’ policy outcomes in relation to EU legislation. More precisely,
the Commission often entrusts third parties with varying degrees of
expertise to collect data and assess member states’ implementation of spe-
cific EU policies. When does the Commission disclose external compli-
ance assessments? On the one hand, the EU’s main supervisory
institution faces pressures to justify its enforcement actions based on reli-
able evaluations of member states’ implementation performance. On the
other hand, public disclosure of external compliance assessments incurs
reputational risks for both the EU Commission and law-violating govern-
ments. For example, exposing member states’ implementation gaps risks
alienating national governments and European citizens. Furthermore,
excessive reliance on external oversight damages the unique reputation of
the Commission as the main monitoring institution in the EU (Maor
2011; Rimkut_e 2018). External compliance assessments could prompt hos-
tile audiences to challenge the Commission’s competence as the main
guardian of the Treaties and inhibits its ability to claim credit for detect-
ing member states’ violations (Weaver 1986).
The findings from this study have important implications for the legit-
imacy of enforcement in the EU context. More generally, I find support
that the EU Commission enjoys discretion over the transparency of infor-
mation about member states’ implementation activities, even if this infor-
mation concerns nationally sensitive topics. Furthermore, I do not find
overwhelming evidence that the disclosure of compliance assessments is
driven by member states’ incentives to conceal their implementation gaps.
Secrecy is rare and the Commission releases compliance assessments,
even when external reports expose member states’ violations of EU rules.
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This finding contrasts with previous results showing that national govern-
ments have remained in charge of the dissemination of information pro-
duced by international bodies (Grigorescu 2007).
Nevertheless, the findings also raise concerns about the extent to
which citizens and interest groups are sufficiently informed about non-
compliance. First, I hypothesised and found that transparency of enforced
non-compliance depends on the expertise of external oversight actors. In
particular, the Commission justifies enforcing policy violations by disclos-
ing assessments produced by agencies with extensive expertise only to a
limited extent. However, the Commission is unlikely to make these assess-
ments publicly available. By pushing compliance assessments away from
the public eye, the Commission deprives interest groups and European
citizens from gaining a better understanding of member states’ implemen-
tation outcomes, especially when this information has been collected by
highly competent overseers. Second, the findings suggest that the
Commission does not reveal information about compliance equally across
member states. Compliance assessments of member states with
Eurosceptic governments and publics are less likely to be widely dissemi-
nated. Given that Eurosceptic societies are especially susceptible to EU
politicisation (Hooghe and Marks 2009), the EU Commission seems to
respond to threats of politicisation (Rauh 2019) by keeping member
states’ implementation outcomes out of public sight. These findings raise
concerns about the long-term impact of growing levels of Euroscepticism
on the Commission incentives for transparency.
More generally, the findings from this study contribute to research on
the politics of information disclosure and reputational incentives of
supranational organisations (Blom-Hansen and Finke 2020). Thus, this
research goes beyond formal rules of transparency as a choice between
secrecy and full transparency (Rittberger and Goetz 2018). In particu-
lar, the study underscores the importance of limited disclosure as a pos-
sible strategy by enforcement institutions to guard their unique
reputations as competent and impartial guardians of the law, when
confronted with pressures to increase openness with respect to their
activities. This finding supports ideas that increasing transparency is
unlikely to lead to a fundamental transformation in organisational
behaviour. Instead, transparency prompts political and bureaucratic
actors to adopt new creative strategies to avoid blame and claim credit
for observed outcomes (Hood 2007).
The findings remain stable across various robustness checks while also
accounting for decisions to delegate oversight powers to external actors.
Nevertheless, the results also raise questions about the Commission’s
incentives to rely on external consultancies for monitoring and assessing
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member states’ implementation outcomes. Future research should further
elucidate the conditions for entrusting external actors with varying levels
of expertise to evaluate member states’ compliance. Moreover, it is also
important to recognise that transparency is a dynamic process. For
example, the Commission may change its transparency practices over
time due to increased demands for openness by organised interest groups
or because of newly acquired information about member states’ non-com-
pliance. Finally, it remains an open question whether the public disclosure
of compliance assessments actually increases citizens’ awareness of
national responses to EU legislation. Future research should attempt to
shed more light on the consequences of information disclosure on the
actual observability of compliance gaps.
Notes
1. Furthermore, studies of communication strategies focus on organizational
responses to criticisms by key audiences. However, reputation-seeking
organizations are eager to avoid accusations in the first place by strategically
managing the release of information about their activities.
2. Conformity-checking reports outline how each directive provision has been
incorporated in national legislation and whether the transposed provisions
conform to the directive requirements.
3. The practice of delegating compliance assessments to external actors is well-
documented by some legal scholars (Kr€amer 2014; Smith 2015). However,
there is no research examining the exact nature of these assessments and the
mandate of external agencies.
4. The total number is limited to 69 directives because I excluded reports that
described the implementation process, but did not explicitly assess member
states’ level of compliance.
5. Another potential disadvantage is that transparency practices may be biased
towards characteristics of the persons requesting information. For example,
the Commission may be less likely to refuse requests from NGOs or
government officials than an individual EU citizen. The purpose of this
study is, however, to assess the transparency of information to EU citizens.
6. Infringement cases against delayed transposition of EU directives are
excluded from the analysis.
7. External expertise is a characteristic of the agency. Thus, an agency that
assessed member states’ compliance only in relation to a specific directive
could be still rated as highly competent if it had previously completed
evaluations on diverse policy areas and at different implementation stages.
8. The Chapel Hill data-set does not include information about Cyprus,
Luxembourg and Malta.
9. Whereas most studies employ Lijphart’s index of interest group pluralism, it
does not include information about the new CEE member states (Lijphart 1999).
10. The external assessment reports provide information about the date of the
main transposition measure in each member state. When this information
was not available, I took the date of the transposition deadline.
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11. I excluded policy-area controls from the main analysis because they over-
determined outcomes of public disclosure. This is because all Social Policy
assessments are publicly available. As already indicated, excluding Social
Policy directives from the analysis does not lead to different results.
12. An alternative explanation would suggest that pro-EU governments
encounter fewer implementation problems and consequently face fewer
reputational losses from the transparency of their implementation activities.
However, alternative model specifications did not support this conjecture.
13. Moreover, some compliance assessments are produced by the same external
consultancies (e.g. Milieu Ltd; Tipik Legal; Odesseus). The variable for
external monitoring expertise and clustering in directives already accounts
for the dependency in the observations at the level of agencies. Therefore,
robustness multilevel models did not produce reliable estimates.
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